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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
producing according to the hopes of the lessee, and that it would
not be any more enticing to another lessee than to the defendant.
It would seem that the court intends to restrict the ruling of
Fite v. Miller15 to the particular factual situation there presented.
The court seems to make it clear that the unconditional obliga-
tion, necessary to come within the facts of that case, must be
explicit in the agreement, and that the lease will not be arbi-
trarily construed against the lessee. This is a plausible position.
The costs of drilling have increased considerably since the deci-
sion in the Fite case, and similar damages would be very heavy,
indeed.
Carl F. Walker
MINERAL RIGHTS-EFFECT OF SPACING ORDERS ON SERVITUDE
Holt owned forty acres of land. In 1939 he sold the east half
to A. J. Pitts and the west half to J. C. Pitts, subject to a reser-
vation in himself of the minerals underlying both tracts. In 1944
Holt had granted an oil and gas lease covering the whole forty
and subsequently conveyed undivided interests in his reserved
minerals. In 1945 the Department of Conservation issued an
order setting up a forty acre spacing pattern for the Holt Zone
and May Sand in the Delhi Field of which this tract formed a
part. In 1946 the lessees obtained a permit to drill on the tract
and a well was completed on the west half which has produced
oil in allowable quantities since that time. In 1947 plaintiff Smith
acquired the east half of the forty on which no well had been
drilled. Plaintiff brought suit against Holt and his assignees to
be declared the owner of the minerals on that part of the tract
alleging the extinguishment of the servitude on that part of the
tract by non-user for a period of ten years. Held, that since a
single lessee held the entire tract, he was the "owner" of the
entire tract within the meaning of the Conservation Act. In such
a situation a pooling order could serve no useful purpose, the
effect of a conventional pooling agreement being achieved by
single ownership. Smith v. Holt, 67 So. 2d 93 (La. 1953).
The Louisiana Conservation Act' provides that the Com-
missioner of Conservation may establish drilling units upon
15. 196 La. 876, 200 So. 285 (1940).
1. La. Act 157 of 1940, now La. R.S. 1950, 30:1 et seq.
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which only one well may be drilled.2 In the event there are sev-
eral tracts within the unit, and the right to drill on these tracts
is owned by different persons, the act provides for a voluntary
pooling of interests or for orders by the commissioner forcing
the various owners to "pool" their interests in the unit and to
share equitably the rights and obligations incident to the devel-
opment of the unit.8 This portion of the act, together with the
power to allocate production, forms the primary instrumentality
by which the commissioner carries out the purpose of the act to
prevent waste of oil and gas and the drilling of unnessary wells.
Conflict between private rights and obligations and the pub-
lic interest as declared by the Conservation Act are inevitable
and a comparatively new field in mineral jurisprudence is de-
veloping delineating the effects of public police power in the field
of conservation upon private interests. The instant case repre-
sents a step in the unfolding jurisprudence on this aspect of
conservation.
It has been held that where two or more separately owned
tracts of land were embraced within a unit forced pooled by the
commissioner the consequent inability of a lessee to drill upon
land which forms a part of such unit is not grounds for the dis-
solution of the lease by the lessor.4 Neither will such a lease
lapse after the expiration of the primary term if a producing
well has been drilled within the unit. 5 Where part of a leased
tract is included within a unit pooled by the commissioner and
a producing well is drilled anywhere within that unit, payment
of royalties by the lessee for the portion within the unit will
hold the entire tract under the lease.8
The court in Sanders v. Flowers7 indicated that prescription
running against a mineral servitude affecting a tract which had
been placed in a drilling unit and forced pooled by the commis-
sioner is either suspended or interrupted by the completion of a
well within the unit. The court refused to say, however, whether
there was a suspension or an interruption. The instant case sheds
2. La. Act 157 of 1940, § 8, La. R.S. 1950, 30:9.
3. La. Act 157 of 1940, § 9, La. R.S. 1950, 30:10.
4. Hood v. Southern Production Co., 206 La. 642, 19 So. 2d 336 (1944).
5. Crichton v. Lee, 209 La. 561, 25 So. 2d 229 (1946); Hardy v. Union
Producing Co., 207 La. 137, 20 So. 2d 734 (1944).
6. LeBlanc v. Danciger Oil & Refining Co., 218 La. 463, 49 So. 2d 855
(1950); Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
7. 218 La. 472, 49 So. 2d 858 (1950); Lewis, Effective Date of Forced
Unitization Orders, 27 Tulane L. Rev. 457 (1953); Comment, 12 Lou[SIANA
LAw REvIEw 445 (1952).
1954]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
no new light on this phase of the problem. The Court of Appeal
for the Second Circuit has, however, in a similar fact situation
ruled that prescription is interrupted.8 Certiorari was denied by
the Supreme Court.
In the present case no forced pooling order was obtained.
Only a general field-wide spacing order was issued by the com-
missioner. Plaintiff contended that under the act, in order to
determine any private rights, it was necessary for a forced pool-
ing order to be issued and for plaintiff to have an opportunity
to be heard; that a spacing order provides only the basis upon
which a forced pooling order may be issued.
To this contention the court replied that there was but a
single owner who had the right to drill and produce from the
pool, and "where there is a sole owner of a unit, a pooling order
can serve no useful purpose." 9 The court was careful to extend
itself no further than necessary for the solution of the problem
before it. Its decision was grounded on single ownership of the
right to extract the minerals being tantamount to a voluntary
pooling.
In Sohio Petroleum Co. v. V. S. and P. R.R. 10 lessors sued to
cancel their leases on the grounds of failure to drill or pay delay
rentals within the term stipulated in the contract. A productive
gas well had been drilled within the unit but had been shut down
while the lessees obtained another order, based upon geological
data obtained from that well, allowing them to drill another part
of the unit in search of oil. The lease contained a clause, common
to the "North Louisiana form," allowing the lessee to form units
conforming to the spacing orders of the commissioner. The court
held that the lessor's contention must fall because of the pooling
clause of the lease and quoted the decision in LeBlanc v. Dan-
ciger Oil & Refining Company" to the effect that "all contracts
of lease with respect to the development and production of
minerals in this state must, of necessity, be subject to the police
power exercised in protecting these natural resources, and that
any provisions of our law with respect thereto form a part of
these lease contracts the same as though written therein.' 2 The
court concluded that "another well could not have been drilled
8. Ohio Oil Co. v. Kennedy, 28 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 1946).
9. Smith v. Holt, 67 So. 2d 93, 96 (La. 1953).
10. 222 La. 383, 62 So. 2d 615 (1952).
11. 218 La. 463, 49 So. 2d 855 (1950).
12. 218 La. 463, 470, 49 So. 2d 855, 857 (1950).
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on this same unit without specific authorization, as secured in
this case, i.e., by obtaining an order from the Commissioner of
Conservation, following a full hearing and based upon his find-
ings, warranting such exception to basic order No. 96. It neces-
sarily follows that the lease did not terminate for failure to pay
rentals.' u3
In Smith v. Holt there was but a single servitude owner
and lessee; in the Sohio case all the tracts in the unit were leased
to the same lessee. This would seem to confine both cases to a
"single ownership" category. Despite this narrow delimitation
these cases seem to stand for the proposition that private rights
and obligations may be placed in limbo by the police power of
the state as enunciated by the commissioner pursuant to the
Conservation Act. No safe indication has been given by the court
as to how far they will extend the effects of a spacing order.
However, it should be safe to assume from the instant case that
where there is single ownership of the right to extract oil or
gas from the ground for oneself or for others on a tract which
has been designated by the commissioner as a unit upon which
only one well may be drilled that a forced pooling order is un-
necessary and that all the effects of a voluntary pooling agree-
ment or forced pooling order will flow therefrom.
Charles C. Gray
SALES-MEASURE OF THE SELLER'S DAMAGES-
SELLER'S PRIVILEGE TO KEEP THE GOODS
Defendant repudiated a contract obligating him to purchase
from plaintiff a certain amount of scrap steel at a fixed price;
plaintiff thereupon brought suit for specific performance. The
demand for specific performance was dismissed by the trial
court and abandoned by plaintiff. But, about a year after the
institution of suit, the case was tried on the alternative demand
for dissolution of the contract and damages for its breach. The
market price of scrap steel had been less than the contract price
at the time of defendant's repudiation; but, at the time of the
trial, it was higher than the contract price. Defendant took the
position that plaintiff had suffered no damages, because the
pleadings showed that he had kept the goods and, consequently,
13. 222 La. 383, 396, 62 So. 2d 615, 620 (1952).
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